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THE STATUS OF SIBLINGS' RIGHTS:
A VIEW INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM
William Wesley Patton* @2001
INTRODUCTION
In 1991, when Dr. Sara Latz and I began researching our article,
Severing Hansel From Gretel: An Analysis of Siblings' Association
Rights, I there were few sibling statutes, fewer cases defining the ambit
of siblings' association, and no national statistical data existed regard-
ing out-of-home sibling placements based upon findings of abuse or
neglect. After two years of compiling a sibling database by contacting
hundreds of state and county child protection agencies and surveying
hundreds of private adoption agencies, we determined that in 1994
there were approximately 35,000 siblings placed in different out-of-
home placements annually.2 Our research uncovered some other very
interesting data regarding siblings. First, the percentage of siblings
placed out of the home into different placements was relatively con-
stant in each state that we studied, with a median of approximately
forty percent.3 Second, we found that the longer the siblings re-
mained in different placements, the greater the likelihood that they
would never be reunited; whereas, most siblings that were initially
placed together, stayed together permanently.4 Moreover, the Fed-
* Professor, Whittier Law School. M.A, 1974, U.C.L.A., J.D., 1977, U.C.L.A. School of Law.
1. William W. Patton & Sara Latz, Severing Hansel from Gretel: An Analysis of Siblings' Asso-
ciation Rights, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 745 (1994).
2. Id. at 745.
3. Id. at 757-58.
4. Id. at 758. There is also a greater likelihood that siblings will remain together if placed
outside the home with relatives rather than with foster parents. "Relatives often express a com-
mitment to care for the children until they come of age and only twenty-three percent of chil-
dren initially placed with kin experienced another placement within three to five years as
compared to fifty-eight percent of children in nonrelative foster homes." Sibling Groups in Fos-
ter Care: Placement Barriers and Proposed Solutions, in REPORT TO THE LEOISLArURE at 6
(1997) (quoted in Rod Kodman, Re-Victimizing Innocent Victims: How California Violates The
Constitutional Rights of Its Abused and Neglected Children, 4 J. of Juv. L & PoL'y 67, 84
(2000)). Out of California's 98,000 children under court supervision sixty percent had siblings,
but "forty-one percent were not living in the same foster home ... [and] [florty-eight percent of
siblings in foster care do not live with relatives." Id. at 87.
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eral Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (FAACWA) 5 had a
highly negative impact on sibling groups: (1) since permanent plan-
ning became the center of the child protection system, the time within
which families could reunify has been shortened from three years to
one year, and under certain circumstances to six months in many juris-
dictions, thus resulting in an increase in parental termination cases;
and (2) because the FAACWA lists adoption as the preferred perma-
nent plan, many siblings in sibling groups are separated as there are
not enough adoptive homes that want to adopt groups of siblings de-
spite the availability of monetary subsidies. 6 Finally, the law has not
kept pace with psychological and sociological studies, which continue
to document the importance of sibling association throughout broth-
ers' and sisters' lives.7 This article charts the progress of the legal sta-
5. Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 670 (1994, Supp. 1998)
[hereinafter FAACWA].
6. One of the main problems with the FAACWA of 1980 was "that it created a tension as
agencies committed to reunification discouraged bonding between foster parents and foster chil-
dren while at the same time, out of concern for child safety, discouraged contact with the child's
biological parents." Megan M. O'Laughlin, A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May Be
The Key To Stopping The Pendulum Of Termination v. Reunification, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1427,
1434 (1998). However, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 created new problems by
creating a shortened period within which parents could demonstrate that they were capable of
caring for their children; "the time line termination standard risks unfairly biasing decisions
against the biological parents." Id. at 1440; see also, 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(k) (2000). "Almost
500,000 children are on the foster care rolls in the United States. 100,000 will not be returned to
their families, but only 20,000 were adopted in 1995." Rod Kodman, Re-Victimizing Innocent
Victims: How California Violates The Constitutional Rights Of Its Abused And Neglected Chil-
dren, 4 J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 67, 79 (2000).
7. For a survey of the post-1991 psychological literature demonstrating the importance of the
sibling bond, see Ellen Marrus, "Where Have You Been, Fran?" The Right Of Siblings To Seek
Court Access To Override Parental Denial Of Visitation, 66 TENN. L. REV. 977, 980-987 (1999).
These recent psychological studies support the importance and uniqueness of the sibling bond
and mirror earlier studies that demonstrated that the bond's importance increases with the de-
gree of access among siblings. Id. at 982-84. For a very interesting discussion of the factors in
early psychoanalytic theory which delayed a focus on the importance of sibling bonds, see BRIAN
CLARK, THE SIBLING CONSTELLATION (Penguin Books ed., 1999). "Once the helping profes-
sions began to view the individual in the context of the family and as a member of a larger group,
psychology became more cognizant of the sibling. Psychological literature on the sibling started
to appear from the 1970's." Id. at 90. The resources available to separated siblings to locate one
another have been dramatically increasing with the development of search engines on the world-
wide-web. For instance, some countries have governmental search sites on-line. See, e.g., Gen-
seek Genealogy, Australia Adoption Information and Notice Board, at http://www.standard.net.
au/-jwilliams/adoption.htm. (last visited July 16, 2001); the Canadien Adoptees Registry, at http://
www.canadianadopteeregistry.org/. In addition, some states are beginning to open previously
closed adoption files which will enable siblings better access to data in locating one another.
Brad Cain, O'Connor Rejects Last Appeal to Block Adoption Law, L.A. DAILY J., May 31, 2000,
at 8. Tennessee, Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, Alabama, and Oregon now permit adult adoptees
access to their original birth certificates. Id.
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tus of siblings since 1991 and projects future trends in the legal
development of sibling association.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF SIBLINGS
Unlike the period prior to 1991, sibling issues have become preemi-
nent among state and federal bills, statutes, and cases during the last
six years. 8 Legislators have begun to recognize the emotional, as well
as the financial, importance of recognizing sibling bonds. For in-
stance, in 1999, state legislation considered sibling visitation,9 siblings'
desire to locate one another after separation,' 0 siblings' rights to re-
cover personal injury and wrongful death damages," tax advantages
for brothers and sisters who care for their siblings,12 and expedited
8. We are beginning to understand the changing demographics of families, including sibling
groups, in contemporary American culture. For example, approximately fifty percent to sixty
percent of all marriages are likely to end in divorce and half of all new marriages involve at least
one previously married partner. BRYAN STRONG & CHRISTINE DE VAULT, MARRIAGE AND
FAMILY EXPERIENCE 528, 562 (6th ed. 1995): WILLIAM J. BENNETIT, THE INDEX OF LEADING
CULTURAL INDICATORS 13 (1994); HOMER CLARK, JR. & CAROL GLOWINSKY, DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS 12 (5th ed. 1995). These remarriages have created bonded relationships among tens of
thousands of stepchildren, thus dramatically increasing the number of siblings subject to out-of-
home placements in the child dependency system. Cynthia Pill, Stepfamilies: Redefining The
Family, in FAMILY RELATIONS 39, 186-193 (1990). These "blended" families often provide the
stepchildren a bond which helps to mollify the earlier divorce. STRONG & DE VAULT, supra
note 8, at 579, 590; Lawrence Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, A Comparison of Clinical and Em-
pirical Literature on Children in Stepfamilies, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 309-18 (1986). Therefore.
states now have to determine whether siblings and step-siblings will be treated similarly in terms
of the right of family association. I thank one of my students, Cynthia Occelli, for her help in
researching these step-family statistics.
9. H.R. 502, 78th Leg., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1999) (permitting reasonable or supervised visitation
among siblings); H.R. 99, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1999) (permitting sibling visits while parent
is incarcerated); H.R. 540, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1999) (reasonable sibling visitation rights):
H.R. 2165, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999) (reasonable sibling visitation rights): H.R. 1787.
81st Leg. (Minn. 1999) (visitation by foster siblings of children formerly in foster care): and S.
264, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1999) (visitation among siblings after the death of a parent).
10. H.R. 58, 78th Leg., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1999) (creation of a sibling registry for separated sib-
lings); H.R. 1393, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999) (biological parents must provide adoptive
parent regarding non-adopted siblings); H.R. 2587, 222d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999)
(sibling registry and access by adopted siblings over eighteen); and H.R. 5310, 222d Gen. As-
sem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (adopted sibling registry).
11. H.R. 15, 140th Gen. Assem. Sess. (Del. 1999) (siblings may recover wrongful death dam-
ages); S. 956, 1999 Sess. (N.C. 1999) (willfully threatening physical injury of sibling) and H.R.
204, 1999 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1999) (damage recovery by sibling whose sibling is
harmed by a illegal controlled substance).
12. S. 118, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (family care and medical leave for siblings to care
for one another); S. 158, 20th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1999) (family leave to care for a sibling); S.
345, 208th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1999) (sibling inheritance tax waiver); H.R. 2546, 222d Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (personal income tax exemption for a sibling caring for a sibling
age seventy or more); and H.R. 4889, 222d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (real property
tax exemption for siblings over sixty-five who own property together).
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termination of parental rights and statutory presumptions based upon
sibling relationships. 13 "Five states have statutes explicitly giving sib-
ling standing to petition the court for visitation. 1 14 Case law over the
last seven years has been no less diverse, as the following analysis will
demonstrate.
A. Post-1991 Case Law
In 1990, I argued that siblings have a fundamental right to associate
and because their relationship is more similar to a parent/child bond
than to any third-party bond, including grandparent/grandchild bonds,
the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that splitting
siblings into different placements is a compelling governmental inter-
est and is the least intrusive means of achieving the state's goal of
protecting children. 15 However, courts have been very reluctant to
recognize a constitutional basis in sibling association, perhaps fearing
that the best interests of one of the siblings will be sacrificed if the
state cannot meet its burden of demonstrating the necessity of sepa-
rating siblings into different placements. 16
In the Adoption of Hugo,17 the United States Supreme Court re-
cently declined to decide whether siblings have a constitutional right
to associate. In Hugo, a four-year-old boy with special needs, due to
his mother's cocaine use, lived in foster care from birth.1 8 When he
was two-years-old, his parents' rights were severed and the court fol-
13. H.R. 740, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (if a child has a sibling who is under four who is
a ward of the court parental reunification services will be provided for only six months rather
than one year); S. 1226, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (reunification services for a child under
four need not be provided if reunification services for a sibling have previously been termi-
nated); H.R. 1115, 20th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1999) (expand definition of group home to ac-
commodate all siblings in a sibling group); S. 232, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1999) (preference
for placing siblings together); and H.R. 731, 222d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (expe-
dited termination of parental rights for a child who has a sibling abused by a parent).
14. Marrus, supra note 7, at 1013. However, most jurisdictions deny siblings standing to seek
visitation in custody matters unless "parents are unable to resolve such matters voluntarily, [and
then] the court hears the children's wishes and determines the children's best interests . I..." Id
at 995-96.
15. William Wesley Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REV.
473, 491-96 (1990).
16. William C. Smith, Common Bonds, Separate Lives: Case Attempts to Create Right of Sib-
lings to Grow Up Together, A.B.A. J., March 1999, at 35. "[N]o state high court has found a
constitutional guarantee of sibling association." Id. State Departments of Social Services do not
want the difficult constitutional burden of proof to interfere with the placements of siblings who
they argue sometimes do not belong together and because it "may be impossible to find one
home for all brothers and sisters." Id.
17. 700 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1999).
18. Id. at 518-19.
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lowed the Department of Social Services' recommendation to place
him in the adoptive home of his six-year-old sister. The adoptive
mother agreed to reunite the siblings in a stable, permanent place-
ment by adopting Hugo. However, the juvenile court judge ordered
that Hugo be placed in the custody of his paternal aunt, who previ-
ously raised a special-needs son. The trial court found that Hugo
bonded with his prospective adoptive mother, as well as his sister.
However, the trial court found that the sibling bond was merely one
factor that the court must consider, and was, therefore, insufficient. 19
The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling
and found that although sibling association is an admirable goal, it is
just one factor to consider in making custody decisions.20 It also re-
jected the argument that sibling association is a fundamental liberty
interest. 2' Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari, demonstrating its continuing disinterest in family associa-
tion rights.
Therefore, we must face reality. Except in a few older cases and
dissenting opinions, it is clear that most lower courts are unlikely to
define sibling association as a fundamental liberty interest. Courts
have not followed the 1985 opinion in L., K., C., B., and H.K. v. G.
and H., 22 which found that "siblings possess the natural, inherent and
inalienable right to visit with each other. ' 23 In contemporary opin-
ions, even when justices note the constitutional significance of sibling
association, they often provide significant limitations. For instance,
Justice Baron, in his 1998 concurring and dissenting opinion in In re
Paul C.,24 stated that children have "fundamental and constitutionally
protected interests in [their] relationships with families to which [they
have] emotional ties."' 25 This is similar to the "caring" requirement of
Michael H. v. Gerald D., which determined that a biological connec-
tion alone is legally insufficient to establish a fundamental right to
associate. 26 The dozens of cases involving siblings' rights between
19. Id. at 521-22.
20. Id. at 524.
21. The court even refused to elevate siblings' associational rights to a presumption; "[wie are
not persuaded in this complex area of familial relationships that the judge should have given
presumptive weight to the sibling relationship." Id. at 524.
22. 497 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
23. Id. at 222.
24. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
25. Id. at 377 (1998).
26. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). See also S.J. & I.J. v. W.L. & L.L., 755
So. 2d 753, 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). The Florida District Court of Appeals held that
siblings did not have standing to raise an associational issue since they "had never lived together
and rarely visited under a mediated visitation schedule, had not established a familial relation-
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1991 and 2000 can be best harmonized and analyzed by grouping them
into several specific factual scenarios.
1. Cases Where One Sibling Resides with Parents but the Other
Sibling Seeking Visitation Resides Outside the
Parents' Home.
A recurring theme in one set of cases concerns the rights of siblings
living outside the parents' home to associate with siblings living in the
parents' residence. These cases usually involve two different types of
separated siblings. The first involves adult siblings who seek, over
their parents' objection, to continue contact with minor brothers or
sisters. The second line of cases deals with siblings, who have been
removed from their parents' home and wish to continue associating.
In these cases, the minors might be placed in different foster, prospec-
tive adoptive, or adoptive homes. Courts have traditionally hesitated
to grant visitation among siblings in contexts where the custodial par-
ent objects. Furthermore, there is much uncertainty regarding courts'
power to grant jurisdiction to order such visitation without a finding of
parental fault or psychological harm to the siblings if visitation is
denied.
One of the most famous sibling visitation cases is In re Interest of
D. W.,2 7 in which parents requested that the state take jurisdiction of
their thirteen-year-old allegedly incorrigible son.2 8 At the disposition
hearing, the court declared the boy a ward of the state and awarded
custody to Department of Social Services (Department) "so he could
be placed at Boys Town."'29 At a second disposition hearing, the boy's
ship sufficient to give them a direct legal interest for standing to intervene and set aside the
adoption." Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Gary M. Farmer provided an interesting theory
for children's associational rights. He posits association as a reciprocal relationship in which the
right can exist only where both individuals have an equivalent associational interest. Id. at 757-
58 (Farmer, J., concurring).
The right in question is an associational right- i.e., an interest in having some future
connection with the adoptee's siblings. An association is a linkage of some kind be-
tween two or more people. An associational right is necessarily reciprocal: A has the
right to associate in some way with B; it corresponds with a right of B to associate with
A. If B has no right to associate with A, A's associational right is meaningless as re-
gards to B. One is useless without the other.
Id. at 757. Justice Farmer's analysis of reciprocal associational rights belies any hints by the
Supreme Court in Michael H. that even though parents have a right to associate with their chil-
dren, children may not have the equivalent associational right.
27. In re Interest of D.W., 542 N.W.2d 407 (Neb. 1996).
28. Id. at 4(19.
29. Id. According to the staff at Boys Town. the minor did extremely well, was a "B" student
and did not exhibit behavioral problems. NATIONAi BROADCAST COMPANY, DATELINE, Jan. 1,
1996.
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custody was changed from Boys Town to his maternal grandmother. 30
At a review hearing, the boy's guardian ad litem requested that the
boy have visitation rights with his almost three-year-old sister, who
was still living at home.31 At a subsequent hearing regarding the re-
quest for visitation, the boy's social worker and his therapist reported
that he "was having a great deal of difficulty dealing with the loss of
his parents and the lack of contact with his sister."' 32 The trial court
ordered that "(1) D.W. have visitation with his sister for one hour per
month, supervised by D.W.'s therapist; (2) D.W.'s parents make their
daughter available for said visitation; and (3) the Department give the
siblings' parents forty-eight hours notice of said visitation." 33 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court held that although the trial court had jurisdic-
tion over the boy and his parents, it "lacked personal jurisdiction over
the sister."'34 The court further noted that the state cannot interfere
with the constitutionally protected parent/child relationship unless the
court adjudicates the child a ward of the state. "Just because one child
in a family is adjudicated as a child coming under the Nebraska Juve-
nile Code does not provide a juvenile court carte blanche jurisdiction
over the adjudicated child's unadjudicated siblings."'35 The supreme
court reversed the trial court and vacated the visitation order.36
In re D. W. is problematic for several reasons. First, nowhere in the
opinion does the court define the nature of siblings' association rights.
We are, therefore, left with the following possibilities: (1) the boy did
not have a statutory or constitutional right to associate with his sister;
(2) regardless of the boy's constitutional or statutory right to visit with
his sister, the court lacked the jurisdiction to provide him a remedy
because it did not have personal jurisdiction over the sister;37 or (3)
30. In re Interest of D.W., 542 N.W.2d at 409.
31. Id.
32. In re Interest of Daniel W., 529 N.W.2d 548. 552 (Neb. Ct App. 1995). The son's parents
had refused to be involved in family reunification efforts and the son had not seen his sister since
she was six months old. Id. at 552.
33. In re Interest of D.W., 542 N.W.2d at 409. A guardian ad litem was not appointed to
represent the sister's interests at this hearing. Id.
34. Id. at 410.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Of course, the court's holding goes well beyond the issue of personal jurisdiction. Suppose
that the daughter applied for visitation rights with the son. In that case, even though the court
would have personal jurisdiction over the daughter, under its theory, the court could still not
grant visitation unless it found the child a ward, otherwise the court would be infringing upon the
parents' fundamental right to parent. Another way the court could avoid the issue is by holding
that the child lacks standing to bring a visitation motion. However, both of those views clearly
abrogate siblings' associational rights by finding preeminent the parents' right to rear their child.
The court does not even analyze whether there is a manner of reasonably accommodating both
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assuming jurisdiction, the boy's associational right depended upon a
finding that visitation was in the sister's best interest. Dependency
courts frequently order family counseling, which often includes all
family members, even nonadjudicated minors. Of course, it is rela-
tively simple for the court to gain jurisdiction over the sister in D.W.
If the Department files a petition alleging that the parents' refusal to
permit reasonable visitation between the brother and sister will cause
the sister unreasonable emotional harm, the court could make the sis-
ter a ward of the state and order either sibling visitation or that the
sister be placed with the maternal grandmother.
Another way in which courts continue to deny sibling association is
by determining that they lack inherent equitable jurisdiction to order
such visitation. For example, in Scruggs v. Saterfiel,38 after a girl's
mother died, she went to live with her aunt while her half-brother
remained with his father. The aunt and girl sought visitation with the
girl's half-brother. 39 The magistrate, who heard the visitation motion
and "found that there was no legal basis for the motion as filed," de-
termined that the motion was frivolous, and ordered the aunt and girl
to pay five-hundred dollars in attorney fees plus costs. 40 Although the
court of appeals set aside the award of attorney fees and costs, it held
that in the absence of a statute, the court lacked jurisdiction to order
sibling visitation.41 Even though the court noted the legislature's clear
statement to preserve the best interests of children's emotional bonds
by statutorily creating a grandparent/grandchild visitation statute, it
determined that no analogous sibling visitation statute had been
promulgated. 42 "Despite our respect for the preservation of sibling
bonds, however, it is not our prerogative to make new laws governing
sibling visitation. That decision belongs to the legislature. ' 43 The
Scruggs court did not discuss the legal nature of siblings' association
or whether a statute that provides such rights would be constitutional
in cases where both siblings were not wards of the court.
sets of rights. See, e.g., Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Eco-
nomic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1463-64 (1967); Francis D. Wormuth & Harris G.
Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254, 255 (1964); Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 917-20, 923-25 (1988); David M. Treiman, Equal Pro-
tection and Fundamental Rights - A Judicial Shell Game, 15 TULSA L.J. 183, 184-85, 195-96
(1980).
38. 693 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1997).
39. Id. at 925.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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The L., et al. V. G. & H44 opinion contrasts sharply with the D. W.
and Scruggs opinions. In L., adult siblings sought visitation with their
minor siblings; however, their father and stepmother objected. The
parties entered into a "Consent Final Judgment" reviewable for ninety
days, which permitted visitation between the adult siblings and the
minor siblings twice per month, reasonable telephone access, and ex-
change of presents.45 Subsequently, the adult siblings filed a motion
to visit with the minor siblings outside of the parents' home, which the
parents again opposed. 46 The court first determined that by analogy
to post-judgement matrimonial litigation, it had jurisdiction over the
visitation issue and the adult siblings had standing as immediate fam-
ily members to bring the action. 47 The court found that "siblings pos-
sess the natural, inherent and inalienable right to visit with each other
... subject to the requirement that such visitation be in the best inter-
est of a minor child .. . . -48 It noted that parents' objections to sibling
visitation are merely one factor to be considered in determining the
best interests of the children. Because the court found that the minors
would be thrust into an emotional turmoil between the parents and
adult siblings, it denied the sibling visitation motion based upon a best
interests analysis. 49 However, even though the L. court recognized
the constitutional basis of siblings association rights, the court did not
require a heightened burden of proof, such as a finding by clear and
convincing evidence.
2. The Sibling Bond Used As One Variable in Determining the
Proper Out-of-Home Placement After Termination of
Parental Rights.
The next set of cases concerns the value of continuing the sibling
bond when all siblings must be placed in different foster, prospective
adoptive, or adoptive homes due to the termination of parental rights.
These cases are most interesting because the court is not required to
factor in biological parents' fundamental right to rear their child when
determining whether to separate siblings or to permit post-termina-
tion contact between siblings. There are a number of positions that
courts take: (1) because there are no conflicting parental constitu-
tional rights, siblings' constitutional right to association may only be
44. 497 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 217.
47. Id. at 217-18.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id.
2001]
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denied when based upon a compelling state interest and using the
least drastic alternative; (2) because no fundamental parental rights
are involved, siblings have a presumptive right to stay together or to
continue visitation if it is necessary to split them into different post-
termination homes; (3) the bond between siblings is only one factor in
determining the best interest of the children; and (4) the new prospec-
tive custodial parents' preference shall receive presumptive considera-
tion. The following cases illustrate a number of approaches used in
determining the value that sibling bonds will have in deciding post-
termination placements and visitation orders prior to finality of
adoption.
In the Interests of David A. 50 reveals a tragic story of domestic
abuse, incompetent parenting, foster care drift, and the separation of
extremely bonded siblings into different post-termination homes.
Four-year-old David was taken from his parents' home by the Depart-
ment of Social Services when he was approximately a year-and-a-half-
old. His three-year-old brother, Andrew, was taken from his parents
at birth and, therefore, never lived with them. During family reunifi-
cation, 5 David lived in five different foster homes and was sexually
abused in one of those placements. 52 David and Andrew "enjoy[ed]
each other's company and have a close sibling bond," which devel-
oped during their visits with one another.53 Evidence also demon-
strated that David "had a bond and strong attachment to his [then]
present foster mother. '54 In determining the post-termination perma-
nent placements for David and Andrew, the court ordered a psycho-
logical study of "the nature and extent of each boy's attachment to the
foster family and each other. '55 However, the court noted that the
possible psychological disruption of separating either of the siblings
from the current foster parents was a strong consideration in deter-
mining permanent placements. The court did not consider whether
the siblings' had a constitutional right to stay together and did not give
the sibling bond presumptive consideration. Instead, the court indi-
cated that a best interest standard would be employed to compare the
50. 1998 WL 910258 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 1998).
51. Family reunification is best defined as: "whenever a child is removed from a parent's or
guardian's custody, the juvenile court is required to order the social worker to provide child
welfare services to the child and the child's parents or guardians for the purpose of facilitating
reunification [reuniting] of the family." GARY SEISER & KURT KUMLI, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE
COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2-145 (1997).
52. 1998 WL 910258 at *5.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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effects of separating the siblings from one another versus separating
the siblings from their different foster parents.56
The court's analysis in David A. substantially undervalues the sib-
ling bond and right to association by reducing sibling association to a
mere variable in a best interest decision. Indirectly, therefore, the
court elevates the foster parents' right to associate to the same level of
importance as the siblings' right to associate. This is a curious result
when viewed historically because most cases have determined that
foster parents' right to associate are of a much lower order than those
involving biological family relationships. One might distinguish bio-
logical parents' association rights from those of foster parents' based
upon the distinction between vested and expectancy rights; foster par-
ents merely hope that they may one day have a vested and permanent
custodial arrangement with the foster child. 57 Because bonded sib-
lings already have a vested right to associate, which is not subject to
vesting upon a condition subsequent and not subject to a continuing
contractual relationship with the state, why should their right to asso-
ciation be treated as merely equal to the foster parents' rights?
A better analysis in cases where parental rights have been termi-
nated is one that treats the siblings' association right as fundamental
and requires the state to demonstrate by clear and convincing evi-
dence that a compelling state interest of protecting the children's best
interest requires splitting them into different permanent homes.
Under this analysis, the state can marshal expert testimony regarding
the psychological harm to the children caused by separating one or
more of the siblings from their current foster parents with whom they
have bonded. Although the court might come to the same conclusion
as a court that uses the David. A. best interest test, the fundamental
rights analysis requires the state to use a less drastic alternative stan-
dard, which might require continued sibling visitation even if the sib-
lings are separated into different permanent placements. Or, as a
56. Id. at *6-8.
57. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1979). During
the child dependency process, even when foster parents have temporary custody of children,
most states do not grant foster parents "party" status. John DeWitt Gregory, Whose Child Is It,
Anyway: The Demise of Family Autonomy and Parental Authority, 33 FAM. L.Q. 833, 835 (1999).
Therefore, even though foster parents may be due some level of procedural due process before a
foster child is taken from them, that level of process is substantially less than that given to parties
(parents and children). See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 315, 315.5, 350 (West 1998). In
Worrell v. Elkhart County Office of Family and Children, the Indiana Supreme Court held that
former foster parents lacked standing to seek visitation with their former foster children who
were placed with new foster parents. 704 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (1998). The court stated that
"[u]nlike parent and step-parent relationships, foster relationships are designed to be temporary
... [and] is [sic] contractual .... Id.
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lesser alternative almost never considered by courts, the siblings might
be placed together and the bonded foster parents could be given a
right to visit with the sibling.
In the Matter of Collins58 is an intriguing case, which uses the sib-
lings' bonding that included foster families as a sword to terminate the
father's rights and separate the siblings into different post-termination
placements. This case involved a dysfunctional family that included a
father involved in drug abuse and crime, and a mother who could not
explain to hospital physicians the numerous bruises on her child. De-
partment of Family Services (Department) could not find a foster fam-
ily that would care for all three children; therefore, five-year-old
Mattie and four-year-old Harry were placed together, and two-year-
old Joshua was placed with a different foster family. Although the
Department provided several years of reunification services, the
mother barely participated. The father was incarcerated for much of
the reunification period and once released, his participation was mini-
mal, he continued to drink, allegedly committed domestic violence on
several occasions, and was again incarcerated. Finally, the Depart-
ment filed a termination petition, which was contested only by the
father.59 After determining that the Department clearly made reason-
able efforts to reunify the family, the court terminated the father's
parental rights. The court noted that termination was in the children's
best interests, in part, because the children had bonded with their fos-
ter families.60 But what is perhaps most unique about this case is the
court's use of the sibling bond as grounds for terminating parental
rights: "As an additional basis to find that termination is in the chil-
dren's best interests, the evidence establishes that the two foster fami-
lies have encouraged visitation between the two children and that they
will continue to do so. Thus, even their sibling bonds will not be
severed." 61
The Collins court's use of the continuation of sibling bonds after
termination as one ground for terminating parental rights is extremely
interesting for a number of reasons. First, it raises the issue whether
parents can now marshal the absence of post-termination sibling asso-
ciation as a rebuttal to petitions to terminate rights. It seems only fair
that if such sibling contact can be marshaled in favor of termination
then it should also be permitted to rebut the wisdom of termination.
Second, what assurance does the court have that the foster families
58. 1998 WL 910258 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 1998).
59. Id. at *1-8.
60. Id. at *17-18.
61. Id. at *18.
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will continue sibling visits? In Collins, there was no court order re-
quiring such visits and although both sets of foster parents indicated a
willingness to adopt the children, there was no assurance that visita-
tion would continue after the termination of the father's parental
rights or that the foster parents would have, indeed, adopted the
children.
Finally, in In re Christina L.,62 the appellate court noted that the
trial court, which terminated the parents' rights to two siblings, com-
mitted an error by failing to determine "what steps could be taken to
preserve their sibling bonds - such as visitation rights with each
other. '63 Christina L. serves as a transition case with the next set of
cases that consider sibling bonds as a factor in determining which
adoptive family should be selected for children after their parents'
rights have been terminated. Although Christina L. determined that
post-termination placement of siblings is a necessary component of
the termination hearing, the next section illustrates that some courts
hold that post-termination placement is outside the ambit of the
court's purview during the termination of rights hearing. As discussed
below, the determination of when post-termination sibling placements
will take place, either at the termination hearing or at some post-ter-
mination adoption hearing, may have a dramatic effect upon the con-
tinuation of siblings' association.
3. The Sibling Bond As a Variable in Determining the Appropriate
Adoptive Family.
This line of cases is concerned with the appropriateness and legality
of post-adoptive sibling visitation. These courts are concerned not
only with the required timing of such decisions, but also with whether,
and under what circumstances, the court can order post-adoption sib-
ling association.
For instance, in Adoption of Vito,6 4 although the trial court deter-
mined that the biological mother was unfit to care for her son, Vito,
the court refused to grant the Department of Social Services' (Depart-
ment) motion to dispense with the mother's consent to adoption.65
However, the court further found that Vito had bonded with his foster
family and ordered that the Department submit "'a new plan for
adoption which provides ... [for maintaining] post adoption contact
between [Vito] and [his biological mother] and [Vito's] [three] biologi-
62. 460 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1995).
63. Id. at 700.
64. 712 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
65. Id. at 1191.
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cal siblings." 66 The court of appeals determined that the trial court
erred in denying the Department's petition to obviate the mother's
consent to adoption because the trial court determined that the
mother was unfit to care for Vito. 67 The court of appeals determined
that the trial courts' concern regarding post-termination visitation was
an insufficient reason for denying the Department's motion because
"the question of [post-termination] visitation is separate and distinct
from the question whether the child's best interests require termina-
tion of parental rights."' 68 However, the court of appeals concluded
that "the judge had authority to order revision of the department's
plan to include visitation with Vito's biological mother and siblings. '69
The distinctions in Vito are not merely epistemological. Severing
the issues of termination of parental rights from post-termination sib-
ling visitation is a decided advantage for the Department because it is
often difficult, if not impossible, for the Department to assure the
court at the termination hearing that post-termination sibling associa-
tion will be guaranteed. If such sibling visitation was a condition pre-
cedent to termination, the Department would often not be able to
meet its burden because an adoptive family may not yet have been
located. However, unlike other courts discussed below, the Vito court
made a very wise decision in holding that the trial court has jurisdic-
tion at the termination hearing to require the Department to seek a
permanent post-termination placement that will further the child's
contact with biological siblings, and perhaps with the biological
mother, as well. But the Vito court also noted the complexity of trial
courts' requirements of post-termination visitation. It stated that if a
prospective adoptive family is informed of the necessity of sibling as-
sociation prior to the placement of the child, the trial court can clearly
order such visitation.70 However, the court noted that it would re-
serve for another day the question of "whether a judge can order
postadoption [sic] visitation where a child has been placed with pre-
adoptive [sic] foster parents who clearly oppose such visitation with
the biological parents."'7' This statement by the court is somewhat
ambiguous because it is uncertain to which kind of cases the court is
referring. If the court is referring to a case in which a judge orders
visitation after an adoption has been finalized, then the court raises a
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting a decree of the trial judge (citation omitted)).
68. Id. at 1193.
69. Id. at 1194.
70. Id.
71. Adoption of Vito, 712 N.E.2d at 1194.
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case in which the vested and fundamental parental rights conflict with
siblings' right to associate because adoptive parents have equivalent
legal rights to biological parents. 72 It might be argued that unless the
court has jurisdiction over all siblings who have been placed in adop-
tive homes, the court lacks the authority to order such post-adoption
visitation even if it is in the best interest of the siblings. However, if
the Vito court is concerned, instead, with whether the court may order
post-adoption sibling visitation prior to the finality of adoption by the
prospective adoptive parents who object to such visitation, the court
raises an easier issue because the prospective adoptive parents do not
have a fundamental right to rear the child at that point. The better
approach is to hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to order post-
adoption visitation until the adoption has been finalized. Otherwise,
if prospective adoptive parents, who have custody based in part on
their agreement to permit sibling post-adoption visitation, change
their minds, the court would not have the ability to require such visita-
tion. Further, if the court lacks the ability to order post-adoption visi-
tation, children will have no leverage in arguing that one set of
prospective parents that is willing to permit continuing sibling contact
should be selected as the adoptive parents, rather than another set of
prospective parents that rejects continued sibling visits. Therefore,
the better approach is to hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to
order post-adoption visitation up to the time that the adoption is
finalized.
In Los Angeles County Department of Children And Family Services
v. Superior Court & Paul C.,73 California took a very different ap-
proach to post-termination sibling association. In Paul C., an Oregon
family, the G.'s, had adopted one of Mrs. C.'s children eleven years
earlier. Subsequently, Mrs. C. gave birth to Paul C.; however, because
Mrs. C. tested positive for cocaine, the custody of Paul C. was trans-
ferred to a foster mother, Mrs. B., 74 five days later. He remained with
Mrs. B. for over a year during which family reunification services took
place. The Department of Children and Family Services (Depart-
ment) received information that the G.'s were willing to adopt Paul.
C. so that the siblings could be reared together. Paul C.'s foster
mother, Mrs. B., with whom he had lived most of his life, was also
willing to adopt him.75 At a review hearing, the Department informed
72. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9305 (West 1998) (providing that adoptees and adoptive par-
ents have a legally identical relationship as natural parents and their children).
73. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Ct. App. 2 Dis. 1998).
74. Id. at 370-74.
75. Id.
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the court of the G.'s interest in adopting Paul C. The court ordered
the Department to institute an Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children 76 with Oregon to determine if placement with the G.'s would
be in Paul C.'s best interest. The Department's report indicated that
Oregon certified that it would help facilitate the G.'s adoption of Paul
C. It also noted that Paul C. was bonded to Mrs. B., who wanted to
adopt him but understood the importance of Paul C. being with his
half-sibling. Therefore, she agreed to assist with the G.'s adoption.77
Over the objection of the Department, the court granted Paul C. a
vacation with the G.'s and ordered Los Angeles County to provide the
airfare. The Department argued that because Mrs. B. had already be-
gun the adoption process, she had a statutory priority in the adoption
proceedings. 78 Subsequently, Mrs. C.'s parental rights were termi-
nated, and the court ordered adoption as the permanent plan. The
trial court agreed that the Department, not the court, generally has
jurisdiction to determine the appropriate adoptive family. However,
the court found that the dilatory nature of the Department's treat-
ment of the Interstate Compact led Mrs. B. to change her mind and
oppose the G.'s adoption of Paul C.79
The court of appeals in Paul C. indicated that the sole issue before
the court was not who should adopt Paul C., Mrs. B. or the G.'s, but
rather "with whom shall Paul be placed pending the adoption deci-
sion?"80 The court of appeals determined that under the Family
Code,81 the Department has the exclusive discretion to decide where
the child shall live pending finality of adoption, and that the trial court
may overrule the Department only if it determines that there has been
an abuse of discretion. 2 Because the court of appeals determined
that the Department did not abuse its discretion in finding that Paul
C. should remain with Mrs. B. pending finality of the adoption, it
found that the trial court abused its discretion by placing Paul C. with
the G.'s.83 The court of appeals refused to consider several constitu-
tional challenges to the statutory scheme because those issues, includ-
ing the question of whether siblings have a constitutional right to
association, had not been litigated in the trial court. However, Justice
Baron, in his dissent, argued that the constitutional issues were dispos-
76. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7900-7912 (West 1998).
77. Id. at 372.
78. Id. at 372-73.
79. Id. at 373-374.
80. Paul C., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374.
81. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8704 (West 1998).
82. Paul C., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374-75.
83. Id. at 375-76.
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itive: "Paul has fundamental and constitutionally protected interests in
his relationships with families to which he has emotional ties, and
hence a due process right to a meaningful voice in decisions that affect
these interests. ' 84 Justice Baron found that the Family Code violated
Paul C.'s right to due process of law because it did not provide him
with a mechanism for challenging the Department's post-termination,
pre-adoption placement. 85 Justice Baron determined that Paul C. had
a "fundamental interest in dwelling with his sibling, and in the deci-
sion to place him with one of the loving families that wish to adopt
him. He is therefore entitled to independent judicial review of the
Department's transfer request .... -86
The consequence of the Paul C. decision is that children in Califor-
nia do not have standing to argue their best interest during the period
between the termination of parental rights and the finality of adop-
tion. The Paul C. decision further subverts siblings' associational
rights to the discretion of the Department.87 The Department can,
therefore, stack the deck against the child's stated preference by plac-
ing the child with the prospective adoptive parent chosen solely by the
Department. The custody and bond with those prospective adoptive
parents will almost assuredly result in a finality of the adoption by
creating a statutory priority for the Department's chosen adoptive
home.88 The California approach in Paul C. strips the trial court of
the authority to consider the best interest of children whose parents'
rights have been terminated. The approach taken by Massachusetts in
Vito is preferable because the trial court retains jurisdiction over the
placement of the child until the finality of adoption, and all parties,
rather than only the Department, will have input on the appropriate
pre-adoptive and adoptive placement.
84. Id. at 377.
85. Id. at 378-79.
86. Id. at 382.
87. There is a significant difference between a case in which the trial court merely substitutes
its judgement for the Department's regarding the child's best interest and a case in which the
trial court hears evidence from all parties and then decides on an appropriate placement. The
former may, as the Paul C. majority noted, violate California Welfare & Institutions Code sec-
tion 366.260) and Family Code section 8704; however, the latter does not. By holding that the
minor did not have a right to a hearing on the pre-adoptive placement the court of appeal made
it almost impossible for the trial court to determine whether the Department abused its discre-
tion regarding that placement.
88. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West 1998) (setting forth a presumption for adoption with a
relative if one exists, or if not, then with current foster parents if the child has been in their care
for at least four months).
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However, the harshness of the Paul C. approach has been partially
ameliorated by In re Cliffton B.,89 which held that the twenty-month-
old and ten-year-old siblings were provided incompetent representa-
tion after they were removed from their parents' home and placed in
separate foster homes with reduced sibling visitation. 90 By holding
that the incompetence of counsel was a reversible error, requiring a
new hearing on post-termination sibling visitation, the court impor-
tantly noted:
the maintenance and strengthening of the fraternal bond during
these months [between the selection of a permanent plan for each
child and the termination of parental rights] may have a significant
influence on the willingness of the prospective adoptive parents to
continue sibling contact and on the visitation plan SSA is required
to formulate in its final adoption report.91
Because the court in In re Cliffton B. recognized that zealous and
competent representation of siblings' post-termination sibling visita-
tion rights were required by the children's attorneys during the pre-
termination hearings, it is less likely that the decision in Paul C. of
limiting the trial court's jurisdiction to change post-termination sibling
visitation will have much effect. If the Department suddenly deviates
from its position regarding the post-termination sibling visitation that
it agreed to in pre-termination permanent planning, then under Paul
C., the court would have jurisdiction to determine whether the De-
partment abused its discretion. Therefore, at the hearing, the Depart-
ment would be required to substantiate its changes in post-
termination sibling visitation.
Other states have given trial courts much greater power than Cali-
fornia has granted to decide the appropriate post-termination and
adoptive placements, as well as visitation rights among siblings. For
instance, in Adoption of Lars,92 the court determined that although
adoption law is a statutory creation, courts have equitable power to
determine post-termination placements and post-adoption visitation
conditions, which may be imposed upon the adoptive parents.93 The
Lars court noted that a court may consider the willingness of the pro-
spective adoptive parents in granting post-adoption visitation as a fac-
tor in determining which adoptive parents to select in the best
interests of the children. 94 A Connecticut court, in In the Interest of
89. 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778 (2000).
90. Id. at 786.
91. Id.
92. 702 N.E.2d 1187 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
93. Id. at 1190-91.
94. Id. at 1192.
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Shamika F, 9 5 used its equitable jurisdiction after terminating parental
rights to order that the current "foster parents, who have expressed a
willingness to adopt these children [three bonded siblings], be given
first consideration in such adoption. '96
Although American courts have been reluctant to determine that
siblings' association is a fundamental constitutional right, the trend is
for courts to treat sibling bonds as an extremely important variable in
determining their best interest. However, perhaps the most important
new development since 1991 is courts' willingness to consider post-
adoption sibling visitation even in the absence of statutory authority
and in the face of opposition by the Department and/or the prospec-
tive adoptive parents.
B. Post-1991 Sibling Statutes
There is no single trend in the statutory treatment of siblings' rights
to associate. Although almost all states have at least one statute rec-
ognizing the importance of sibling bonds, some states, such as South
Carolina, did not pass a sibling statute until 1998.97 Although every
state currently considers sibling association among emotionally
bonded children an important governmental interest, most state stat-
utes do not create a right to sibling visitation;98 rather, they posit the
sibling bond as merely one variable in a best interest test to determine
where children should be placed once separated from their parents.99
Some states require "reasonable efforts" to place siblings together,11°0
while others create a presumption that sibling visitation is in the chil-
dren's best interest. 10 1 In addition to the creation of sibling visitation
95. 1999 WL 111943 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 26. 1999).
96. Id. at *6.
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(44) (West 1985, Supp. 2000).
98. A few states create a "right" to visitation. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59
(West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616 (1994) ("reasonable visitation rights ...."); LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. ART. 136 (West 1999) ("reasonable visitation rights..."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 119 § 23 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525.2 (1999). Florida has specifically
delineated that its legislative intent to continue sibling contacts even after siblings are sent to
different out-of-home placements "establish goals and not rights." FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.4085
(West 1999, Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 7202 (West 1998); CAL. WELF. & INSTr. CODE § 16002
(West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-4-2 (Michie 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-53
(Michie 1999); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1027-a (Gould 1999); N.H. REV. ST AT. ANN. § 169-C:19-d
(1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §38-1159 (1994).
100. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-53(f)(2) (Michie 1999) (stating that "[e]very rea-
sonable effort has been or is being made to place siblings or psychologically bonded children
together .... ).
101. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW, § 358(a)(l1)(b) (McKinney 1992) (providing that
"[pilacement or regular visitation and communication with siblings or half siblings shall be pre-
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statutes, three other statutory developments constitute emerging
trends: (1) granting siblings standing to raise visitation issues; (2) pre-
adoptive sibling visitation; and (3) post-adoptive or permanency plan
visitation.
1. Standing
Prior to 1991, statutes did not address siblings' standing to bring
visitation issues before the court. Today, there are a variety of such
statutes. 10 2 Some states, such as Maryland, specifically grant siblings
standing: "[a]ny siblings who are separated due to a foster care or
adoptive placement may petition the court, including a juvenile court
with jurisdiction over one or more siblings, for reasonable visitation
rights."' 10 3 Another approach is to permit standing only if the child
has attained an age that the legislature considers sufficiently mature to
permit the child to have the capacity to make a reasoned choice
among alternatives. For instance, Massachusetts provides that "[a]ny
child who has attained the age of 12 years, may request visitation with
siblings who have been separated and placed in care or have been
adopted in a foster adoptive home other than where the child re-
sides. '10 4 New York provides siblings an opportunity to visit, but only
if "equity" demands such a result and "a proper person on his or her
behalf" petitions the court.10 5
Although the trend of providing children standing to petition for
sibling visitation is a step in the right direction, standing may be illu-
sory absent a requirement that the sibling be notified of the right to
visit and/or the right to have counsel represent the sibling in court.
For instance, how is a very young child going to learn that he or she
has a sibling residing elsewhere? We cannot presume that as the mi-
nor matures, the foster parents will necessarily inform the child of his
or her siblings, or that the foster parents will even know that such
sumptively in the child's best interests unless. ... ). See also, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw,
§ 409(e)(1)(d) (McKinney 1992) (requiring that reasons must be stated if no sibling contact is to
be ordered). Other states indicate that sibling visitation is a priority. See, e.g. MASS. GEN. LAws.
ch. 119, § 23 (1999); N.J. STAr. ANN. § 9:6B-4 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-535.2
(1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.4085 (West 1999).
102. Most state courts have adopted a "'no [sibling visitation] statute - no standing-no right to
visitation' rule." Joel V. Williams, Sibling Rights To Visitation: A Relationship Too Valuable To
Be Denied, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 259, 287 (1995). See also, Marrus, supra note 7, at 999-1003
(discussing the lack of sibling standing in family law courts).
103. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525.2(a) (1999).
104. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 17, § 26(5) (1999).
105. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1999).
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siblings exist. 106 In addition, if court's do not continue the appoint-
ment of counsel for children after the termination of parental rights,
but before a permanent plan for adoption or guardianship is finalized,
the child will not have an attorney to advocate for sibling
association.107
2. "Pre-Adoptive"/Permanency Planning Sibling Contact
Legislators have begun to realize that sibling association must be
addressed at intake rather than being postponed until parents have
been found unfit because the initial out-of-home placement may be
determinative of the quality and duration of the sibling bond.108 For
instance, California requires the court to determine sibling visitation
issues at the first detention hearing, which normally occurs within one
judicial day of the Department taking the children into protective cus-
tody.10 9 In addition, instead of placing the entire burden of visitation
on the siblings and their temporary guardians or foster parents, some
states are beginning to assist in the micro-management of sibling vis-
its. For instance, New Jersey has not only created a right to sibling
visitation, it has also defined the right to include "the provision or
arrangement of transportation as necessary."' 10 Finally, it is becoming
clearer that the Department has a duty to investigate and foster sib-
106. Sibling registries which permit adult siblings to locate one another are an inadequate
remedy since they do not provide children the means of locating one another during the several
years in which they may be separated into different out-of-home placements. See, e.g. ARK.
CODE ANN.§ 9-9-504 (Michie 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-307 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.165 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (1999).
107. See In re Jesse C., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 609, 613-15 (Cal. 1999). The appellate court upheld
the discretion of the trial court to terminate the child/attorney client relationship upon a finding
that the minor would no longer benefit from the appointment of counsel even though the child
had not yet been permanently placed in an adoptive home or long-term guardianship. Id. Since
the California Legislature has recently created a means of post-adoption sibling visitation, under
Jesse C., there may no longer be an attorney available to assist siblings in regaining or keeping
contact. Id. See WELF. & INST. CODE § 16002 (1998). See also, William Wesley Patton, Search-
ing For the Proper Role of Children's Counsel in California Dependency Cases; Or, the Answer to
the Riddle of the Dependency Sphinx, 1 J. CENTER CHILDREN COURTS 21, 34-35 (1999). Attor-
neys in Los Angeles who are appointed to represent children are mandated to "explore and
argue for appropriate visitation orders between the child . . . [and] siblings . . . [and] [w]hen
appropriate, the attorney shall seek an order allowing the child to have an after-court visit with
siblings .... Los Angles County Superior Court Rules, Rule 17.16 (West 1999).
108. LEPERE ET AL., LARGE SIBLING GROUPS: ADOPTION EXPERIENCES 29 (1986). See also,
Patton & Latz, supra note 4, at 758.
109. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 1442(g) (West 1998); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 315 (West
1998).
110. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 1999). But see, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501.1
(11)(g) (West 2001) (providing that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require or
prohibit the social worker's facilitation, transportation, or supervision of visits between the child
and his or her siblings.").
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ling visitation during concurrent planning; the initial case plan must
consider how to facilitate sibling association irrespective of whether
the children are reunited with their parents or permanently placed
outside their home.'" Therefore, even though courts and legislators
have not delineated sibling association as a fundamental right, the De-
partment, in a growing number of states, has been mandated to con-
sider sibling bonds and to continue sibling contact at every stage of
the dependency process.
3. Post-Adoption/Permanency Planning Sibling Association
Prior to 1991, almost all courts denied post-adoption sibling visita-
tion for one of two reasons: (1) many jurisdictions had "closed" adop-
tion schemes in which the child's new address and the identity of the
adopting parents were confidential;" 2 and (2) it was considered wiser
to allow the adopting parents control over who should have access to
the new adoptive family unit rather than having the court impose ad-
ditional relationships. 1 3 However, it is in this area of post-adoption
sibling contact that dependency law has quickly and radically
evolved.114
It is interesting to note that recent post-permanency planning sib-
ling association statutes are devoid of policy language that recognizes
the overriding interest of adoptive parents' rights to control the selec-
tion of those with whom the adoptive sibling will or will not have asso-
ciation.115 For instance, there is no discussion of balancing the rights
11l. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-15-13(8)(h) (2000) (providing that "concurrent planning ...
[shall include] placement of siblings"). See also, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501.1 (g) (West
2001).
112. The future of closed adoption schemes is currently in doubt since adoptees are gaining
ground in receiving access to their natural parents' names. For instance, Alabama, Alaska, Ten-
nessee, Delaware, Kansas, and Oregon permit adult adoptees access to their original birth certif-
icates which usually contain their birth parents' names. Justice Rejects Block on Adoption Law,
L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2000, at A14. The day that the Oregon law went into effect "[m]ore than
2.2010 adoptees already ... [had] paid $15 and filed applications with the state Health Division to
get their original birth certificates." Cain, supra note 7, at 8.
113. C.G.F. v. T.F., 483 N.W.2d 803, 804-07 (Wis. 1992); In re Ridenour, 574 N.E.2d 1055,
1060 (Ohio 1991); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 458 N.E.2d 94, 99 (I11. App. Ct. 1983); In re J.M.,
589 N.E.2d 1101 (111. App. Ct. 1992); In re Topel, 571 N.E.2d 1295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Dept. of
Children & Family Serv. v. Charlene T., 631 N.E.2d 257 (I11. App. Ct. 1994).
114. Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative Adoption: Can
It Survive The Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 483, 509 (1996). "In 1996 only 2 statutes
providing cooperative adoption statutes required the involvement of the child in the contract."
Id.
115. "[Clourts have begun to emphasize the sibling relationship and to place it above the
wishes of adoptive parents." Troy D. Farmer, Protecting The Rights of Hard To Place Children
In Adoption, 72 IND. L.J. 1165, 1172 (1997). However, the final draft of the Uniform Adoption
Act "authorizes enforceable open adoption orders only in the limited category of stepparent
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of the adoptive parents with the siblings' rights to have contact. In-
stead, most statutes merely use a best interest of the sibling standard
in determining whether, and under what circumstances, communica-
tion will continue. For example, Florida requires the state "[t]o make
every possible effort" to have siblings adopted into the same adoptive
home or if that is not possible, "to keep them in contact with one
another" after the adoption. 16 Florida goes even further by declaring
that siblings have a right to post-adoptive association, and it further
provides the court with jurisdiction to determine "the nature and fre-
quency of the communication or contact" between siblings.
117
But some states have gone further in assuring that sibling associa-
tion receives preeminent consideration as an integral component of
permanency planning. These states make continued sibling contact a
discrete variable in determining which parents will be granted adop-
tion. These statutes are of critical importance because they, in effect,
require the Department to locate prospective adoptive parents who
are willing to permit continued association among brothers and sis-
ters. For instance, Illinois requires that in "determining which pro-
spective adoptive family to select the court shall consider the value of
preserving sibling ties." 18 West Virginia assures that even if siblings
are separated into adoptive homes at different times, they will be able
to not only continue contact, but possibly be placed in the same adop-
tive home by requiring the Department to notify the siblings' adoptive
parents of the availability of his brother or sister for adoption.119
adoptions. Section 4-113 of the UAA authorizes the judicial creation and enforcement of post-
adoption visitation rights for the former parent, as well as certain other persons, based upon a
determination of the adopted stepchild's best interests." Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption
In Context: The Wisdom And Enforceability Of Visitation Orders For Former Parents Under Uni-
form Adoption Act § 4-113, 51 FLA. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1999). The UAA drafters stated that the
"purpose of the open adoption law is to increase the number of stepparent adoptions by provid-
ing an incentive to noncustodial parents to consent to such procedures." Id. at 97.
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(k) (West 1999).
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022(1) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (West 1999).
"Effective May 14, 1998, if a birth parent's parental rights have been terminated ... the court
may order continued contact between the child and any siblings not included in the adoptive
proceeding." Cynthia Swanson, Adoption, Paternity, and Other Florida Family Practice, APF Fl-
CLE-2-1 (1998). Several states now require the court and Department to consider sibling associ-
ation as part of the permanent placement plan. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-525.01(H)
(West 1999) (sibling visitation must be considered in a long-term guardianship); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-338(e)(3) (Michie 1997) (permanent planning must consider the reasons for sibling
separation and "the efforts.., to reunite the siblings as soon as possible .... ); Mass. Title XVII
§ 23(A) (1999) (court must periodically review post-adoptive sibling visitation); VT. STrAT. ANN.
tit. 15 § 4-112(a) (2000).
118. ILL. ADOPTION CODE § 15.1(b)(7) (1999).
119. W. VA. CODE § 49-2-14(d) (1999). California requires that "[w]here a child is being con-
sidered for adoption, the department or licensed adoption agency shall .... [consider whether]
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West Virginia has tipped the scales toward keeping sibling association
alive after adoption proceedings by shifting the burden of proof onto
any party who opposes post-adoption sibling visitation and elevating
the standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence. 20 West Vir-
ginia is the first state to elevate sibling association rights to the
equivalent fundamental nature of parent/child associational rights,
which also require proof by clear and convincing evidence before ter-
minating parent/child relationship. 121
Today, there is a continuing trend both in judicial opinions and leg-
islative action to recognize the importance of the sibling bond. 122 But
where do we go from here?
III. SIBLING ASSOCIATION IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM
It is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will soon de-
clare sibling association a fundamental liberty interest. 123 The Court
recently declined an opportunity in the Hugo case to determine this
issue. 124 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has no satisfactory meth-
odology to determine conflicting fundamental rights among several
groups of individuals. Rather, it views these conflicts as zero-sum-
games, in which recognizing one set of fundamental rights subtracts
from another group's. Historically, whenever children's constitutional
placement would permanently separate the child from other siblings who are being considered
for adoption or who are in foster care and an alternative placement would not require the per-
manent separation .... CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710 (West 1999).
120. W. VA. CODE § 49-2-14(d) (1999).
121. In our earlier article, Dr. Latz and I argued that a compelling state interest analysis with
proof by clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate standard for determining sibling asso-
ciation separation. Patton & Latz, supra note 1, at 797-800.
122. Many states now provide a variety of enforcement mechanisms to assure post-adoption
visitation, such as contempt, incarceration, compensatory and punitive damages, fines, "make-
up" visits, mandatory counseling, and/or community service. Mahoney, supra note 103, at 136-
37.
123. Although two courts have found a constitutional basis for sibling visitation, even in those
cases, the courts' analyses are different from the fundamental rights analysis applied to parents'
rights to associate with their children. Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (N.D. Ill.
1989); James M. v. Maynard, 408 S.E.2d 400, 410 (W. Va. 1991). Those courts merely analyzed
the best interest of each sibling to continue contact and neither case required a demonstration by
clear and convincing evidence that such visitation should not take place. Aristotle P., 721 F.
Supp. at 1006; James M., 408 S.E.2d at 410. Judges have great difficulty simultaneously recogniz-
ing the child as an individual and as a group member. "Judges who decide abuse and neglect
cases should view the child as a member of a family, not as an isolated member of society ....
However, judges should be very self-conscious in thinking about children as members of fami-
lies. They should not allow their attention to stray from the welfare of the children, and should
be made aware of the danger of slippage occasioned by the parent-centered nature of family law
jurisprudence." James G. Dwyer, Children's Interests In A Family Context-A Cautionary Note,
39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1073 (1999).
124. Supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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rights have been balanced against parents' or a state's compelling in-
terest, children have lost.t 25
Even though the Constitution may never provide protection for sib-
lings, there are at least two current statutory trends that when viewed
together will substantially increase the number of siblings who remain
together after the termination of their parents' rights: (1) concurrent
planning and (2) kinship adoption.
A. Concurrent Planning and Sibling Association
It is yet to be determined whether concurrent planning, by itself,
will be beneficial or detrimental to siblings' rights. Unfortunately, the
first major study of concurrent planning did not address its effects on
siblings.' 26 One possibility is that concurrent planning will exacerbate
the percentage of children whose parents' rights are terminated, thus
freeing siblings for permanent placements outside the home,1 27 but
not necessarily in the same placement. The percentage of parents
whose rights are terminated under concurrent planning statutes varies
drastically from state to state and sometimes even county to county
within a state. For example, in New Jersey only "[ten percent] of the
children involved in Concurrent Planning go home,"' 28 whereas in
Colorado, the percentage of children returning home varied from
thirty percent to forty-eight percent among counties.' 29 In North Da-
kota, for "those children with a filed TPR [termination of parental
rights], about eighty percent of parents voluntarily terminated their
rights. '1 30 "The Concurrent Planning process may be perceived as a
125. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). The Supreme Court held that parents, or the state if
a child is in its custody, presumptively represent the child's best interest even if the child dis-
agrees with the parents' or state's determination of the child's best interest. Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Thus, if a court engages in a balancing test to determine due
process, the deck is always stacked against the child's stated preference if it conflicts with the
parents' or state's views on the child's best interest. When one adds courts' traditional suspicion
of young children's reasoning ability, it is almost impossible for children's stated preferences to
be treated equally with that of adults.
126. LORRIE L. LUTZ, CONCURRENT PLANNING: TOOL FOR PERMANENCY SURVEY OF SE-
LEcTED SITES (2001).
127. In addition to concurrent planning mandates, state statutes now expedite the time within
which families can cure the problems which led to court jurisdiction, and some states have
stripped reunification service from parents who commit an increasing number of specific acts of
child abuse. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (a)(2) (West 1998) (providing a maximum of
six months of reunification services if the child is under three years old and section 361.5 (b)
provides that "[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described ...
when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following" types of abuse
(listing twelve specific fact situations)). Id. at § 361.5(b).
128. Lutz, supra note 114, at 22.
129. Id. at 23.
130. Id.
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fast track toward adoption unless social workers are carefully super-
vised and the case review process is rigorous and objective so that it
can truly become a fast track to good practice.' 31 The other possibil-
ity is that because permanency planning begins with the initial depen-
dency hearing, the court and Department have more time to find a
permanent placement willing to adopt or care for the sibling group if
parental rights are terminated.
The Federal Government has not only mandated that states imple-
ment concurrent planning in order to receive economic assistance, 132
it has also specified that "children under eight and their older siblings
• . ."133 are a concurrent planning special target group. 34 We are,
therefore, likely to see many creative sibling concurrent planning stat-
utes promulgated within the next few years. For example, a California
bill would expedite the placement of a sibling group into permanent
placements if one sibling is under three and another sibling is over
three by stopping reunification services after a maximum of six
months.' 35 The bill is interesting because group sibling status effec-
tively becomes a state sword, limiting the natural parents' opportunity
for reunification without the state having to prove that there is an
actual prospective adoptive family willing to adopt the sibling
group. 136
B. Kinship Care and Adoption
There are several reasons for states' recent emphasis on relative fos-
ter placements and relative adoptions. First, a focus on relative care
mirrors contemporary American family structure in which "[r]oughly
four million children under the age of eighteen live with a family
131. Id. at 24.
132. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F) (1994).
133. Department of Human Services, Bulletin #98-8-7, at 7-1 (Sept. 18, 1998). For an excellent
history of concurrent planning, see Anita Weinberg & Linda Katz, Law and Social Work in
Partnership for Permanency: The Adoption and Safe Families Act and the Rule of Concurrent
Planning, 18 CHILDREN'S LEGAL R'rs. J., 4-11 (1998).
134. So far, most state statutes have merely mandated that sibling contact be considered as
part of the concurrent permanent plan in order to meet federal requirements. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-15-13(7)(h) (2000) (requiring that concurrent planning shall consider the placement of
siblings together); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.3(a)(4) (West 1999) (requiring "[p]lacement
of siblings and half-siblings in the same home, if that placement is found to be in the best interest
of each of the children .... ). See also, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338(a)(3) (Michie 1999).
135. California Assembly Bill 740 (Steinberg, Feb. 24, 1999).
136. The Federal government now provides "an additional $6,000 per additional foster child
with special needs" that is adopted. Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The
Promise And Failure of the Adoption And Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 651-
52 (1999). Because large sibling groups are defined as "special needs" children, the monetary
supplement should help in placing more siblings together in permanent family arrangements. Id.
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member other than a parent." 137 From 1988 to 1995, for instance, kin-
ship foster care increased forty percent. 138 Second, like concurrent
planning, the Federal Government has focused on relative care as a
new placement preference. 139 Third, children placed outside the
home with relatives experience less foster care drift, and relatives are
more willing to keep large sibling groups together than are foster par-
ents.140 Finally, kinship care is often cheaper than other forms of tem-
porary foster placements.' 41 There are, therefore, many reasons for
the new infatuation with relative care. However, even though kinship
care may increase the number of siblings who remain together while
being placed temporarily or permanently outside the natural parents'
home, there is a danger that those children will be more at risk than
other foster or adopted children because of the lowering of standards
and mandatory periodic review of kinship care households. 42
There is a positive synergistic relationship between concurrent plan-
ning and kinship adoption, which bodes well for increasing the quan-
tity and quality of sibling association. Because concurrent planning
forces the Department to look for an alternative permanent place-
ment immediately, and since most states now give a priority to kinship
placement, more siblings will be placed in the custody of relatives at a
time when psychological bonding is paramount. Because more rela-
tives are willing to adopt sibling groups than other foster parents and
there is more stability in kinship care than in other foster care, it is
137. O'Laughlin, supra note 6, at 1448.
138. Wilder v. Bernstein, 49 F.3d 69, 71 (2nd Cir. 1995). One study in Texas showed that in
the past year the state "doubled the number of children living with relatives." Lutz, supra note
114, at 23.
139. "The Secretary may award grants to public and private nonprofit entities in not more
than 10 States to assist such entities in developing or implementing procedures using adult rela-
tives as the preferred placement for children removed from their home .... ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106(3)(B) (1994). And the Federal government has determined to study "the nature, scope,
and effects of the placement of children in kinship care arrangements, pre-adoptive homes, or
adoptive homes .... 42 U.S.C. § 5113(b)(6) 1994.
140. O'Laughlin, supra note 6, at 1451.
141. Some states pay relatives less than other foster parents to care for the children. Note:
The Policy Of Penalty In Kinship Care, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1053 (1999). Other states
reduce the number of court review hearings for children placed in relative care. See Mr. CozE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-826.1(f)(ii) (1999) (providing that in a permanency plan the court
"is not required to hold a review hearing every 6 months if the court ... grants guardianship of
the child to a relative ... or determines that the child shall be continued in permanent foster care
or kinship care .... ; and OKLA. STAr. ANN. tit. 10 § 7003-5.5(c)(8)(i)(2) (West 1999) (providing
that kinship guardian agreements need not be periodically reviewed if the parties and court
agree).
142. Megan O'Laughlin has noted that even though kinship care may mollify the harsh conse-
quences of expedited permanent planning, it may put more children at risk than those placed in
traditional foster placements. O'Laughlin, supra note 6, at 1448, 1451.
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more likely that sibling groups will permanently remain together even
if their parents' rights are terminated.
C. Sibling Visitation After Troxel v. Granville 143
At common law, grandparents did not possess a legal right to visit
their grandchildren.1 44 However, in the 1970's, through the lobbying
efforts of several grandparent organizations, many states promulgated
"grandparent visitation statutes" that gave grandparents derivative or
independent statutory rights to associate with their grandchildren. 145
However, as grandparent visitation statutes began to conflict with par-
ents' rights to determine which third parties should be permitted to
have extended contact with their children, several states questioned
the constitutional vitality of such statutes. 146 Court battles among ex-
tended family members over association with children began to take
both an emotional and financial toll on parents, children, and grand-
parents.147 By 1999, several states had declared their grandparent visi-
tation statutes unconstitutional. 148  The Georgia Supreme Court
143. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
144. See, e.g., Theresa H. Sykora, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Are the Best Interests of the
Grandparent Being Met Before Those of the Child?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 753, 758 (1996); Note, Grand-
parents' Visitation Rights in Georgia, 29 EMORY L. J. 1083 (1980).
145. For an interesting history of the genesis of a grandparent visitation statute which the
court overruled as unconstitutional, see Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1272-73 (Fla. 1996).
See also, Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 771, n.2 (Ga. 1995). "The first Grandparents'
Visitation Statute was in this state [Georgia] in 1976, allowing the trial court, in its discretion, to
grant reasonable visitation rights to a grandparent whenever the court had before it a question
concerning the custody or guardianship of a child." Id.
146. Parents have argued that permitting third party standing to seek visitation with children
over the express rejection by parents harms families by depleting family resources. For instance,
in one California grandparent visitation case the parent "incurred over $80,000.00 in fees and
costs in trial court and over $30,000.00 on appeal in order to prevail in defense of her parental
'autonomy'." Jeffrey W. Doeringer, Grandparent Visitation: Dead or Alive?, 42 ORANCE
CouNTY LAWYER 32, 38 (April 2000) (discussing Troxel, 530 U.S. 57).
147. In another case a mother successfully fought a lawsuit brought by her ex-husband's par-
ents who wanted monthly visitation with her child. After a five year court battle which cost the
single mother $130,000 plus $5,000 for separate legal counsel for her daughter, the mother was
left "angry and resentful" as she asked "[w]hy should any parent be put through this?" David G.
Savage, Fractured Families at Core Visitation Issue, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at Al.
148. In contrast, several state courts found grandparent visitation statutes constitutional, espe-
cially if the issue was considered with other custody questions which were already pending in the
court. See, e.g., Clinebell v. DCFS, 711 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Gaffney v. Menrath
& Gaffney, 1999 WL 34600 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. Jan. 29, 1999); McGuire v. Morrison, 964 P.2d 966
(Okla. Ct. App. 1998); In re Santoro, 578 N.W.2d 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Michael v. Hertz-
ler, 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
See Graville v. Dodge, 985 P.2d 604, 616 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (determining that because grand-
parent visitation statutes do not substantially infringe parental rights, the rational basis test
should be used). The court stated that because of the instability of the modern nuclear family,
the legislature's "attempt to strengthen intergenerational ties as an alternative or supplementary
[Vol. 51:1
THE STATUS OF SIBLINGS' RIGHTS
voided its statute because "the state may only impose ... [grandpar-
ent] visitation over the parents' objections on a showing that failing to
do so would be harmful to the child. ' 149 The court determined that it
was "irrelevant" that it might be better or more desirable for the child
and grandparents to continue association. 50
In 1998, the Florida Supreme Court also determined that its grand-
parent visitation statute violated independent state constitutional pri-
vacy protections, because the statute did not require the state to prove
harm to the child and that grandparent visitation was a compelling
state interest.151 But it was the Washington Supreme Court's opinion
invalidating its grandparent visitation statute that prompted the
United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Troxel v. Gran-
ville.152 The Washington court determined that its grandparent visita-
tion statute was unconstitutional because it did not require a
demonstration of harm or threat of harm to the child, and it did not
require the state to demonstrate that such visitation was a compelling
state interest and that it was narrowly drawn. 153 The United States
Supreme Court was expected to bring closure to the issue of grandpar-
ents' versus parents' privacy and associational rights to children in
Troxel v. Granville; however, Troxel raises more questions than it an-
swers. The Troxel case does provide several clues regarding how the
Supreme Court might decide sibling association issues.
In Troxel, an unmarried couple had two daughters when separated,
and the father moved back into the paternal grandparents' home
where he often visited with the two children. After the father commit-
ted suicide, the mother informed the paternal grandparents that she
was going to limit their visitation to "one short visit per month. '154
The paternal grandparents brought suit to obtain additional visitation
with the two children. 155 The trial court granted the visitation motion,
but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the paternal grandpar-
source of family support for children" is not unreasonable. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Campbell,
896 P.2d 635, 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
149. Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 773.
150. Id. at 773-74.
151. Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510, 514-517 (Fla. 1998).
152. The Washington Supreme Court case was originally titled Smith v. Stillwell, 969 P. 2d 21
(1998). However, the writ of certiorari was filed as Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Washington Revised Code Section 26.10.160(3) provides that "'[ainy person' to petition a supe-
rior court for visitation rights 'at any time,' and authorizes that court to grant such visitation
rights whenever 'visitation may serve the best interest of the child."' Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60 (quot-
ing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997)).
153. Stillwill, 969 P.2d at 19-21.
154. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
155. Id. at 67.
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ents lacked standing. 156 The Washington Supreme Court disagreed
and held that the Washington visitation statute granted grandparents
standing; however, the court held that the statute "unconstitutionally
infringe[d] on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children"
because the trial court did not find harm or potential harm to the chil-
dren and because the statute was overbroad by permitting "any per-
son" to seek such visitation. 157
In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court issued a plurality opin-
ion finding that the Washington visitation statute was unconstitu-
tional.' 58  The Troxel plurality noted that parents' liberty interest in
rearing their children "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court."'' 59 However, the plurality refused
to "define... the precise scope of the parental due process right in the
visitation context" because it held that the Washington visitation stat-
ute was unconstitutional as applied to the Troxel family.' 60  Instead,
the plurality found the Washington visitation statute "breathtakingly
broad" and determined that it was constitutionally infirm for several
reasons.' 6  First, the statute provided that "any person" could seek
visitation "at any time."'' 62 However, the plurality never articulates
why the breadth of potential visitation applicants or the liberality of
such visitation schedules, at least without a showing of additional con-
stitutional infirmities, violates parents' liberty interest. 163 Rather, the
plurality focused upon two other objectionable aspects of the visita-
tion statute: (1) the parent's decision regarding visitation was not
given "any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever;"'' 64 and
156. Id.
157. Id. at 69.
158. Id. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and was joined by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Justices David H. Souter and Clarence Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions, and Justices
Anthony M. Kennedy, John Paul Stevens, and Antonin Scalia wrote separate dissenting
opinions.
159. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
160. Id. at 73. Douglas W. Kmiec has criticized the plurality for failing to delineate the consti-
tutional boundaries of visitation statutes: "Such judicial timidity fails to supply any meaningful
guidance to state legislatures now forced to review the adequacy of their visitation laws." U.S.
Supreme Court Undermine Parental Rights in 'Troxel,' L.A. DAILY J., June 29, 2000, at 6.
161. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57, 67.
162. Id.
163. Id. In his concurring opinion Justice Steven Souter describes the interrelationship of the
overbreadth of potential third party visitors with the weakness of the best interest standard: "It
would be anomalous, then, to subject a parent to any individual judge's choice of a child's associ-
ates from out of the general population merely because the judge might think himself more
enlightened than the child's parent." Id. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 67. The plurality noted with approval that section 3104(e) of the California Family
Code provides a "rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is not in the child's best
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(2) the parent's wishes could be overruled if the judge merely deter-
mines that visitation with a third party is in the child's best interest. 165
It appears that the plurality would approve a visitation statute that is
more narrowly drafted and provides sufficient weight to the parents'
decision. The plurality left for a different day the question of whether
a finding of "harm or potential harm to the child" is a "condition pre-
cedent to granting visitation."1 66
The other justices' opinions in Troxel were extremely divergent.
Justice Souter found the Washington visitation statute facially uncon-
stitutional because of its overbreadth and its almost unlimited judicial
discretion to overrule parental choice. 167 Justice Thomas concurred
and not only stated that parents have a fundamental right to rear their
children, but that he "would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of
fundamental rights.' 68 Justice Scalia dissented arguing that the foun-
dation of parental rights rests within the "unalienable rights" in the
Declaration of Independence and in the "othe[r] [rights] retained by
the people, ' 169 which as established in the Ninth Amendment "shall
not be construed to deny or disparage."' 70 Justice Scalia did not de-
termine whether "parental rights constitute a 'liberty' interest for pur-
poses of procedural due process"'171 or whether a parent may assert a
child's "First Amendment rights of association or free exercise." 172 In-
stead, he opined that since parental rights are not expressly mentioned
in the Constitution, state courts, rather than federal courts, are more
appropriate forums for defining the ambit of those rights. 173 Justice
interest if parents agree that visitation rights should not be granted." Id. at 70 (quoting CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3104(e) (West 1998)). The Court also upheld statutes that require a finding by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the third party "visitation 'will not adversely interfere with
the parent-child relationship."' Id. at 70 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (1998)).
165. Id. at 67.
166. Id. at 73.
167. Id. Justice Steve Souter noted that "parental choice in such matters [as family associa-
tion] is not merely a default rule in the absence of either governmental choice or the govern-
ment's designation of an official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in whatever
circumstances." Id. at 79.
168. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91.
169. Id. (quoting DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1776).
170. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
171. Id. at 92 n.1.
172. Id. at 93 n.2.
173. Justice Scalia says that we should not usher in "a new regime of judicially prescribed ....
family law." Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He also notes that "state legislatures have the great
advantages of doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to correct their mistakes in
a flash, and of being removable by the people." Id. Janet M. LaRue says that Justice Scalia in
his disent indicates that he does not favor parental rights as a constitutional concept. "There is
now ... one fewer champion of parental rights, Justice Antonin Scalia." Scalia's Bad Hair Day
Leads to His Reversal On Rights of Parents, L.A. DAILY J., June 29, 2000, at 6.
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Kennedy's dissent argued to remand the case to the Washington Su-
preme Court to determine whether, in this case, the parent's constitu-
tional right to rear her child was violated. He indicated that, under
some circumstances, a best interest test may be constitutional and a
demonstration of harm is not always a prerequisite to order visitation
over parents' objections. 74 Perhaps most interesting is Justice Ken-
nedy's willingness to consider the possibility that third party associa-
tion rights might be so strong that they are "not necessarily subject to
absolute parental veto."' 75 "In light of the inconclusive historical re-
cord and case law," Justice Kennedy stated that he "would be hard
pressed to conclude the right to be free of such review [court review of
disputed visitation issues] in all cases is itself 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' "176
It is Justice Stevens' dissent, however, which provides the greatest
support for children's independent associational rights. Although he
would not overrule the Court's historic finding that parents presump-
tively act in their children's best interest, he recognized the fallacy of
applying that presumption in individual cases: "[E]ven a fit parent is
capable of treating a child like a mere possession. 1 77 Therefore, he
disagreed with the Washington Supreme Court, which required a
showing of parental fault before approving third party visitation. Jus-
tice Stevens rejected both the Washington Supreme Court's and the
plurality's characterization of third-party visitation issues as "a bipolar
struggle between the parents and the State over who has final author-
ity to determine what is in a child's best interests... [because] [t]here
is at a minimum a third individual, whose interests are implicated in
every case to which the statute applies - the child."' 78 Justice Stevens
indicates that children's associational interests must be balanced with
other family associational interests in determining the child's best in-
terest. 179 He widened the associational issue from merely holding that
parents' decisions presumptively outweigh a child's or third party's to
an issue of Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which case
states may "consider the impact on a child of possibly arbitrary paren-
tal decisions that neither serve nor are motivated by the best interests
of the child." 80
174. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 94.
175. Id. at 98.
176. Id. at 100 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
177. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 88.
180. Id. at 91.
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Because the Supreme Court, in Troxel, chose not to decide whether,
or under what circumstances, the Constitution controls third party vis-
itation, some have argued that the decision is a victory for "non-tradi-
tional families, such as gay partners with one biological parent ...
because it doesn't close the window on existing case law that recog-
nizes the rights of former partners of biological parents. ' 1 81 However,
it is uncertain what effect Troxel will have on sibling visitation case
law and statutes. 182
1. Pre-Termination of Parental Rights
The Troxel plurality made it clear that third-party visitation issues
are not simply a best interest of the child analysis and that the state,
which has jurisdiction to order such visitation over the objections of
the child's parent, must at least afford the parents' wishes a presump-
tive value. 18 3 Consider the following Arkansas sibling visitation
statute:
The chancery courts of this state, upon petition from any person
who is a brother or sister, regardless of the degree of blood relation-
ship, or, if the person is a minor, upon petition by a parent, guard-
ian, or next friend in behalf of the minor may grant reasonable
visitation rights to the petitioner so as to allow the petitioner the
right to visit any brother or sister, regardless of the degree of blood
relationship, whose parents have denied such access. The chancery
courts may issue any further order which may be necessary to en-
force the visitation rights.184
181. David Pike, Supreme Court Re-Establishes Parents' Rights, L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 2000,
at 1, 9 (quoting Professor Joan Hollinger). The Troxel opinion was so general and amorphous
that all sides to the controversy claimed victory: "The decision also was hailed by advocacy
groups on both sides of the political spectrum. While conservatives saw it as protecting family
values, liberals saw it as preventing interference in nontraditional families." Id. at 9.
182. Troxel "reaches little further than invalidating one state statute which granted exceed-
ingly broad powers to the courts in an area of protected fundamental interests. The definition of
the ability of legislatures to act in this area will have to wait for yet more cases in order to clear
the quagmire." Ronald W. Nelson and Overland Park, Troxel v. Granville: The Supreme Court
Wades into The Quagmire Of Third-Party Visitation, 12, No. 6 Divorce Litigation 101 (June
2000).
183. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70.
184. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-102 (Michie 1999). Although this sibling visitation statute is a
domestic relations law rather than a child dependency law, its text illustrates the purest form of
sibling rights legislation that I have been able to locate. It therefore serves as a vehicle for
determining the constitutional/unconstitutional cusp of Troxel. None of the justices in Troxel
differentiated the ambit of parents' due process rights according to the nature of the proceeding
in which visitation orders are mandated. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70. Therefore, as long as there is
sufficient state action in a domestic relations action, there is no reason to believe that any of the
Troxel justices would analyze the parents', child's, third-party's or state's rights and interests
differently than in a state-initiated dependency case. However, there is a possibility that some
justices might consider that a domestic relations case, which is usually initiated by a party, not
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The Arkansas sibling visitation statute is somewhat less invasive than
the Washington grandparent visitation statute considered in Troxel.
First, unlike the Washington law, which permitted any third party to
seek visitation with a child, the Arkansas code is limited to visitation
among brothers and sisters. Therefore, the facial overbreadth of the
Washington statute does not exist in the Arkansas statute. Second,
unlike the Washington statute, which permitted any visitation that is
in the best interest of the child, the Arkansas statute only permits
"reasonable visitation rights." The constitutional vitality of sibling vis-
itation statues modeled on the Arizona law will depend upon how
courts define "reasonable visitation." If it is simply an alternative for
"best interests," then under Troxel, such statutes will fall because they
do not give any presumptive weight to the parents' decision. How-
ever, if courts interpret "reasonable visitation" as visitation in the sib-
lings' best interests after a finding by clear and convincing evidence or
after the parental preference is rebutted, then such sibling visitation
statutes will probably survive a Troxel attack. 185
The Arkansas sibling visitation law is unique because it treats all
siblings equally, whether or not they are related by blood. This means
that blood siblings, adopted siblings, and step siblings have equal asso-
ciation rights under the statute. However, depending upon which
Troxel opinion is applied, the distinctions among the three types of
sibling groups may be dispositive on the question of the ambit of sib-
ling association. For instance, the plurality may not be troubled that
blood related and adopted siblings are treated identically because they
are treated identically by all states; an adopted child becomes the legal
equivalent of a child birthed by the adopting parents. 186 Because
blood related and adopted children share an identical legal status in
the family, the plurality would probably find that visitation between
them is less likely to "place a substantial burden on the traditional
the state, is insufficient state action in implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The determinative fact would therefore be who moved to permit the sibling visitation in
the domestic relations case. If a party or a non-party brought the visitation motion there would
not be sufficient state action. However, if the court already had entered a visitation order and
on its own changed that order to permit visitation with a third party, then Troxel should apply.
185. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70. The Plurality in Troxel noted with approval the California statute
which creates a rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is not in the child's best inter-
est if opposed by the child's parents and also approved of the Nebraska and Rhode Island stat-
utes which required a finding of clear and convincing evidence. Id. (discussing the application of
NEii. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (1998) & R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999).
186. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9305 (West 1998) (providing that "[a]fter adoption, the adoptee and
the adoptive parent or parents shall sustain towards each other the legal relationship of parent
and child and have all the rights and are subject to all the duties of that relationship").
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parent-child relationship" than other third party visitation motions.1 87
However, although step-children may live together in the same family,
they are not necessarily legally related; only if a step-parent adopts a
child of the step-parent's spouse will the siblings be legally related.',88
Therefore, the plurality might uphold a state statute providing sibling
visitation rights for blood related siblings and adopted siblings, but not
for non-adopted step-siblings because disagreements among the par-
ties (i.e. the birth mother and father of one sibling, and the birth
mother and father of the step-sibling) might create great discord
among the families.' 89 Therefore, the nature of the sibling relation-
ship may be dispositive on the level of constitutional protection.
2. Post- Termination of Parental Rights
Once parents' rights have been terminated, the plurality fears that
third-party visitation will interrupt the traditional parent/child rela-
tionship in which parents have a fundamental right to rear their child.
None of the individuals, such as foster parents, guardians, or prospec-
tive adoptive parents, who seek visitation with the children post-ter-
mination have a fundamental constitutional right of association. 90
Therefore, Troxel will have little impact on post-termination visitation
cases.
However, does Troxel give any clues as to how the Court will treat
conflicts among parties in post-termination, but pre-adoptive visita-
tion disputes? For instance, how will the court analyze a conflict be-
tween two siblings who want to be placed in the same adoptive home,
and the Department, which may want to place the more adoptable
187. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64.
188. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 1998) (providing that "[a] stepparent desiring to adopt a
child of the stepparent's spouse may for that purpose file a petition in the county in which the
petitioner resides.") The stepparent adoption can only take place with the consent of the birth
parent or after the birth parent's termination of parental rights. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 9003(a) (West 1995). Some courts have held that stepparents who do not adopt the children of
the stepparent's spouse have no right to visit stepchildren after divorce from the natural mother.
See, e.g., Kogon v. Ulerick, 405 S.E.2d 441 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); O'dell v. O'dell, 629 So. 2d 891
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); B.J. v. J.D., 950 P.2d 113 (Alaska 1997). But see, Spells v. Spells, 378
A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977). See also, Bryce Levine, Divorce and the Modern Family: Provid-
ing In Loco Parentis Standing to Sue For Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution Proceed-
ing, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315 (1996). Since there will never be two legal mothers or two legal
fathers, stepparent adoptions do not violate the plurality's fear of visitation orders which "place
a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child relationship." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64.
189. Such a distinction which does not give non-adopted step-children an association right is
problematic since it will harm millions of children. Today approximately one-sixth of all children
live in stepparent families and over one-third of all children will spend some time in a step
Family. BRYAN STRONG & CHRISTINE DE VAULT, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY EXPERIENCE 528,
562 (6th ed. 1995).
190. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66.
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sibling into a prospective adoptive home in which the adopting par-
ents object to post-adoption sibling association?' 91 The central ques-
tion is whether the Court will treat siblings who are free from parental
care because of termination differently than other third parties seek-
ing custody or visitation with one or both of the siblings. The Troxel
plurality's approach was historical; it concluded that parents had a
fundamental right to rear their children because "[t]he history and
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children."'192 If the
plurality were to accept the overwhelming historical and psychological
evidence concerning the role of siblings in the care and upbringing of
one another, as well as the evidence of the importance of that rela-
tionship until death, the Court might be willing to elevate sibling asso-
ciation rights above all other associational rights except those of
parents. 193
Further, it is likely that Justice Stevens would join the plurality in
finding siblings' association rights greater than those of third parties.
Because Stevens rejected the presumption that a fit parent will neces-
sarily make decisions in children's best interest, he is also likely to
reject a presumption that the state necessarily makes decisions in sib-
lings' best interest.194 Justice Stevens saw the heart of a parent's right
to rear his or her child as "tied to the presence or absence of some
embodiment of family."'1 95 Therefore, Justice Stevens is likely to ac-
191. For a lengthy analysis of a similar issue, see supra notes 108-116.
192. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)).
193. For a detailed discussion of the historical and psychological aspects of sibling visitation,
see Patton & Latz, supra notes 1-2. In his Troxel dissent Justice Scalia refused to extend
unenumerated parental association rights to third party visitation issues. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92
(Scalia, J., dissenting). However, he left for another day whether such unenumerated association
rights might "constitute a 'liberty' interest for purposes of procedural due process . I..." Id  at 92
n.1. Therefore, Justice Scalia might require a minimal due process showing before siblings are
placed into an adoptive home which will not permit post-adoption sibling visitation.
194. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Troxel Justice Stevens defined the visita-
tion issue as more than "a bipolar struggle between the parents and the State over who has final
authority to determine what is in a child's best interests. There is at a minimum a third individ-
ual whose interests are implicated in every case to which the statute applies - the child." Id. at
86.
195. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his Troxel dissent Justice Kennedy also
noted that children may have a right to associate with other third parties who have provided care
over time: "Cases are sure to arise-in which a third party, by acting in a care giving role over a
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily
subject to absolute parental veto." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Certainly, siblings who have
associated for any length of time and who have nurtured one another fit Justice Kennedy's defi-
nition of those having associational interests. Justice Kennedy indicated that states may be enti-
tled to provide some third parties association rights over the objections of parents where the
state can demonstrate severe psychological harm to the child. Id. at 99. See Z.C.W. v. Lisa W.,
71 Cal. App. 4th 524, 528 (1999) (holding that "absent any legislative or case authority granting a
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cept psychological literature that defines the sibling bond as an impor-
tant and integral family unit deserving constitutional definition and
protection. Stevens was clear regarding children's individual associa-
tional interests: "But presumptions notwithstanding, we should recog-
nize that there may be circumstances in which a child has a stronger
interest at stake than mere protection from serious harm caused by
the termination or visitation by a 'person' other than a parent."'' 96 It
is this notion of independent children's association rights that can
form the basis for constitutionally treating siblings and other third
parties differently when considering custody and visitation between
siblings.
Many courts have used the distinction between inherent or individ-
ual association rights versus derivative rights to distinguish the ambit
of different groups' rights. For instance, in Pier v. Bolles, a mother
petitioned for a modification to a paternal grandparent visitation
court order after the father relinquished his parental rights. 197 The
Pier court noted that grandparent visitation was "statutorily derived"
and "a grandparent's ability to seek visitation in the first instance is
premised upon the relationship between the grandchild and his or her
parent. Once the parental relationship is terminated, the statutory ba-
sis on which a grandparent can seek visitation is likewise extin-
guished."1 98 As with siblings, the Court could hold that siblings' have
an inherent or "unalienable" right to associate, whereas all non-parent
third parties merely have a non-constitutional means of pursuing asso-
ciation. t 99 The Court might then require either that the state prove a
compelling state interest in separating the siblings or a showing by
clear and convincing evidence that sibling association is not in the chil-
dren's best interest. Therefore, the Court would functionally treat sib-
lings' post-termination association rights similarly to parents' pre-
termination rights.
nonparent visitation rights over the objection of the biological parent and in the absence of any
showing of detriment to the child, we cannot grant those rights here [to a non-de-facto
parent].").
196. Id. at 90.
197. Pier v. Bolles, 596 N.W.2d I (Neb. 1999).
198. Id. at 6. The Pier court held that once a grandparent had received a court order to visit a
grandchild, the relinquishment of parental rights by a parent does not extinguish the visitation
order. Id. However, a grandparent would lack standing to bring a new visitation order subse-
quent to the parent's relinquishment. Id. at 7-8.
199. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "a right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children is among the 'unalienable Rights' with which the Declaration of
Independence proclaims 'all Men ... are endowed by their Creator"').
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IV. CONCLUSION
At present, siblings' associational rights lack constitutional legiti-
macy, in part, because courts have seldom agreed to address the issue,
and, in part, because courts fear the consequences of recognizing sib-
lings' constitutional rights. What will happen if children's associa-
tional rights are equivalent to parents' rights to associate with their
children? How will courts decide cases where parents refuse to permit
siblings that are separated into different placements from visiting one
another without creating dysfunctional families? Such questions are
red herrings because the same issues must be answered in cases in
which siblings possess statutory rights of association. 200 For now, sib-
lings must continue looking to legislatures and courts to define the
ambit of sibling association. However, as in any area of political de-
bate, siblings need to better publicize their social importance and legal
plight. Unfortunately, most siblings lack the ability to galvanize the
public unlike other groups that have been effective in garnering a na-
tional day of recognition that maximizes public exposure in raising the
nation's consciousness of that group's importance.20 Some recent ex-
amples of special interest national recognition days are Women's
Day,202 Secretaries' Day, and Take Your Daughter to Work Day. The
closest analogy is National Grandparents' Day, which not only pro-
vides merchants with another captive consumer audience, but also
spotlights the importance of grandparents within this society. Adver-
tisements in magazines and on radio and television magnify the me-
dia's coverage of these social groups and give them both legitimacy
and symbolic social value. The time is ripe for a National Siblings
Day.
200. Courts should not fear granting siblings a fundamental right to associate since the Court
can use an identical analysis for resolving conflicting familial associational rights which it uses in
any other case which involves conflicting fundamental rights. In reaching an outcome the Court
can balance the various family member's associational rights, consider any state compelling in-
terests, and make a reasoned determination under the facts as it must do in any case involving
conflicting fundamental rights.
201. Biography.cor, Mother's Day: How It Began, at http://www.biography.com/features/
mother (last visited June 18, 2001) (providing a history of Mother's Day).
202. See Alex Field, Rally to Mark Women's Day, L.A. TiMES, March 6, 2000, at Al.
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